All smart contracts of GMX can be found at [https://github.com/gmx-io/gmx-contracts](https://github.com/gmx-io/gmx-contracts) and [http://github.com/gmx-io/gmx-synthetics](http://github.com/gmx-io/gmx-synthetics). However, only those in the Assets in Scope table are considered as in-scope of the bug bounty program.

If an impact can be caused to any other asset managed by GMX that isn’t on this table but for which the impact is in the Impacts in Scope section, you are encouraged to submit it for the consideration of the project. 

Detection of malicious Timelock transactions will be eligible for a bounty if it is submitted 1 hour after the malicious transaction was sent, this is to allow time for the GMX team to self-report based on their own monitoring. An exception to this would be if the Timelock transaction is able to cause losses in less than an hour’s time due to any misconfiguration of the Timelock, in which case it would be preferred that the report be submitted as early as possible.


GMX is a decentralized spot and perpetual exchange that supports low swap fees and zero price impact trades.

Loss of user funds by freezing, theft, or manipulation of the price of GLP

Theft of governance funds

Permanent freezing of user funds (with value > $250,000)

Insolvency

Redirected funds by address modification

Shell access on server

Ability to execute system commands

Extract Sensitive data/files from the server such as /etc/passwd

Taking Down the application/website

Bypassing Authentication

Signing transactions for other users

Redirection of user deposits and withdrawals

Subdomain takeover resulting in financial loss (applicable for subdomains with addresses published)

Wallet interaction modification resulting in financial loss

Direct theft of user funds

Tampering with transactions submitted to the user’s wallet

Submitting malicious transactions to an already-connected wallet

Direct theft of any user funds (with value > $250,000), whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield

Thefts and freezing of unclaimed yield of any amount

Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Spoofing content on the target application (Persistent)

Users Confidential information disclosure such as Email

Subdomain Takeover without financial loss (applicable for subdomains with no addresses published)

Privilege escalation to access unauthorized functionalities

Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds

Block stuffing

Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)

Theft of gas

Unbounded gas consumption

Temporary freezing of funds for any amount of time

Changing details of other users without direct financial impact (CSRF)

Redirecting users to malicious websites (Open Redirect)

Third-Party API keys leakage that demonstrates loss of funds or modification on the website.

Rewards are distributed according to the impact of the vulnerability based on the [Immunefi Vulnerability Severity Classification System V2.2](https://immunefi.com/immunefi-vulnerability-severity-classification-system-v2-2). This is a simplified 5-level scale, with separate scales for websites/apps and smart contracts/blockchains, encompassing everything from consequence of exploitation to privilege required to likelihood of a successful exploit. 

All web/app bug reports must come with a PoC with an end-effect impacting an asset-in-scope in order to be considered for a reward. Explanations and statements are not accepted as PoC and code is required.

Critical smart contract vulnerabilities are capped at 10% of economic damage, primarily taking into consideration funds at risk, but also PR and branding aspects, at the discretion of the team. However, there is a minimum reward of __USD 50 000__.

The following vulnerabilities are not eligible for a reward:

  - Exploits that require access to the Timelock admin keys or Fast Price Feed admin keys
  - Cases involving risks of losses to the GLP pool in case the assets in the pool decrease in price
  - Cases involving price manipulation on exchanges
  - Vesting schedules might be slightly faster for multiple deposits
  - Vault.includeAmmPrice and Vault.useSwapPricing are not reset to default values for certain cases, these variables will not be used
  - Vault.liquidatePosition does not pay the transaction sender for certain cases, this is intentional
  - Exploits that are not economically practical to execute
  - Exploits due to delays or sizes of price feed updates
  - In general, we assume that the fees earned from swaps and leverage trading over a period of a few months will be larger than any potential losses from price updates, we will be analyzing past data to adjust the fees and parameters for this. Additionally, any changes relating to the minimum price movement for profit as well as the cooldown duration for redeeming GLP will only be done after this analysis.  This analysis will also consider cases where opening both a long and short position within the minimum price movement may result in a higher probability of profit. Reports relating to these should be excluded.
  - Calling Vault.setTokenConfig, Vault.clearTokenConfig, Vault.setTokenConfig on the same token would lead to double counting of the token amounts in GlpManager, Vault.clearTokenConfig will not be used
  - GlpManager.getAum may return a slightly higher value until a liquidation occurs
  - GlpManager.getAum may return a slightly lower value when there are shorts in profit but the price movement is below the 1.5% threshold
  - It is possible for a user to burn and then mint GLP to frontrun price movements, the fees are assumed to be sufficient to prevent this from being profitable
  - There will be some deviation of Vault.globalShortAveragePrices from the true average price if users increase their short position while the mark price is within 1.5% of their position’s average price, it is evaluated to not be economical for users to do this intentionally whether in combination with GLP minting or otherwise, GlpManager.setAumAdjustment can be used to correct this drift if required
  - Vault.CollectSwapFees (_ token, feeAmount, tokenToUsdMin ( _ token, feeAmount))
  - It is expected that liquidators, order executors and other keepers will validate that transactions succeed before sending them to avoid gas griefing attacks
  - Exploits due to issues with hosting providers e.g. Netlify, Cloudflare Pages, IPFS and which cannot be fixed by changing any configuration on our side will be given an Informational classification, these exploits should be reported using the bug bounty program of the hosting providers instead

Payouts are handled by the __GMX__ team directly and are denominated in USD. However, payouts are done in __ETH__ or __USDC__

GMX

Resources & Documentation