Assets of MakerDAO can be found at [https://github.com/makerdao](https://github.com/makerdao)

Due to the regularly-updating smart contracts, only the GitHub links are provided. However, to find the most up-to-date deployment addresses, you can refer to [https://chainlog.makerdao.com/](https://chainlog.makerdao.com/)

Unless explicitly listed, only pages of the web/app assets in addition to the direct link are considered in-scope of the bug bounty program. Other subdomains are not considered as in-scope.

Full documentation can be found at [https://docs.makerdao.com/](https://docs.makerdao.com/) and annotations can be found at [https://docs.makerdao.com/other-documentation/smart-contract-annotations](https://docs.makerdao.com/other-documentation/smart-contract-annotations). A comprehensive guide to the smart contracts can be found at [https://docs.makerdao.com/maker-protocol-101](https://docs.makerdao.com/maker-protocol-101). 

Further information about the Governance Voting asset can be found at:

  - [https://github.com/makerdao/gov-polling-db](https://github.com/makerdao/gov-polling-db)
  - [https://github.com/makerdao/governance-portal-v2](https://github.com/makerdao/governance-portal-v2) 
  - API documentation: [https://vote.makerdao.com/api-docs](https://vote.makerdao.com/api-docs)
  - Gov polling db endpoint (can be used to view graphql schema)
    - prod: [https://polling-db-prod.makerdux.com/api/v1](https://polling-db-prod.makerdux.com/api/v1)
    - staging: [https://polling-db-staging.makerdux.com/api/v1](https://polling-db-staging.makerdux.com/api/v1)

MakerDAO is one of the first DeFi protocols in the crypto space that introduced the first crypto-backed stablecoin called Dai (DAI), which is set at a value of 1:1 with the United States Dollar. It is governed by those who hold and/or are delegated MKR, the governance token of the protocol. 

Manipulation of governance voting result deviating from voted outcome and resulting in a direct change from intended effect of original results

Direct theft of any user funds (with value > $250,000), whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield

Permanent freezing of user funds (with value > $250,000)

Protocol Insolvency

Taking Down the application/website

Direct theft of user funds

Execute arbitrary system commands

Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server such as /etc/shadow, database passwords, and blockchain keys(this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)

Taking state-modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as, changing registration information, commenting, voting, making trades, withdrawals, etc.

Subdomain takeover with already-connected wallet interaction

Malicious interactions with an already-connected wallet such as modifying transaction arguments or parameters, substituting contract addresses, submitting malicious transactions

Theft of unclaimed yield

Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Temporary freezing of funds for at least five blocks

Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without Javascript (Persistent) such as HTML injection without Javascript, replacing existing text with arbitrary text, arbitrary file uploads, etc.

Changing sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as email or password of the victim, etc.

Improperly disclosing confidential user information such as email address, phone number, physical address, etc.

Subdomain takeover without already-connected wallet interaction

Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds

Block stuffing

Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)

Theft of gas

Unbounded gas consumption

Redirecting users to malicious websites (Open Redirect)

Changing non-sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as changing the first/last name of user, or en/disabling notification

Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without Javascript (Reflected) such as reflected HTML injection or loading external site data

Smart contract fails to work correctly, but doesn’t lose value

Rewards are distributed according to the impact the vulnerability could otherwise cause based on the Impacts in Scope table further below.

__Reward Calculation for Critical Level Reports__

For critical Smart Contract bugs, the reward amount is 10% of the funds directly affected up to a maximum of __USD 10 000 000__. The calculation of the amount of funds at risk is based on the time and date the bug report is submitted. However, a minimum reward of __USD 150 000__ is to be rewarded in order to incentivize security researchers against withholding a bug report. 

Critical website and application bug reports will be rewarded with __USD 100 000__, only if the impact leads to a direct loss in funds involving an attack that does not require any user action at all. An impact of minting tokens on-chain beyond intended activity without requiring any user action would also be rewarded this amount due to the undesired dilution of existing circulating tokens. All other impacts that would be classified as Critical, or an impact resulting in a theft of funds that does not fall under this definition, will be rewarded __USD 50 000__.

For the Protocol Insolvency impact, the amount considered at risk is the amount that lenders cannot receive back. 

__Repeatable Attack Limitations__

In cases of repeatable attacks for smart contract bugs, the amount of funds at risk will be calculated with the first attack being at 100% of the funds that could be stolen and then a reduction of 25% from the amount of the first attack for every 300 blocks the attack needs for subsequent attacks from the first attack, rounded down. For avoidance of doubt, if a second attack would happen at 600 blocks and then a third at 900 blocks, the funds at risk would be counted at 50% and 25% of the reward from the first attack, respectively.

However, for smart contracts directly holding funds that cannot be paused, if a discovered vulnerability includes the temporary locking of funds that could otherwise be withdrawn and thus prevented from being stolen but still accessible to the exploiter to take the funds, the time is extended to the exact same time as temporary locking. Extensions of the temporary locking that introduce a gap where withdrawals can happen will not be considered. 

__Reward Calculation for High Level Reports__

High smart contract impacts will be capped at up to 100% of the funds affected. In the event of temporary freezing, the reward doubles for every additional 300 blocks that the funds could be temporarily frozen, rounded down to the nearest multiple of 300, up to the hard cap of __USD 100 000__. However, if it is within the hard cap, there is a further hard cap of 1000% of the funds affected with the minimum reward of __USD 5 000__.
However, a temporary freezing impact with less than 150 blocks will be downgraded to Medium.

__Restrictions on Security Researcher Eligibility__

Security researchers who fall under any of the following are ineligible for a reward:

  - Compensated team members of any MakerDAO affiliate
  - Employees and team members of third-party suppliers to a MakerDAO affiliate that operate in a technical capacity and have assets covered in this bug bounty program
  - Team members and third-party suppliers of businesses and organizations that are not a MakerDAO affiliate but have assets considered as critical infrastructure covered under the bug bounty program

__Public Disclosure of Known Issues__

Bug reports covering previously-discovered bugs acknowledged below are not eligible for any reward through the bug bounty program. 

  - Considering MCD_ETH - The asset steward is aware that the balance of the contract may be different than the total amount that is deposited if users send ETH directly to the contract. They do not believe this has a negative impact on the system and so unless a report can show how having a higher balance does have negative consequences we will consider reports on the actual balance being higher than the sum of balanceOf values out of scope.

  - Considering all adapters -  The asset steward is aware that the balance (ETH or token) of the contract may be different than the total amount that is joined through the contract if users send tokens or ETH directly to the contract. They do not believe this has a negative impact on the system and so unless a report can show how having a higher balance does have negative consequences they will consider reports on the actual balance being higher than the sum of tokens 'join'ed out of scope.

__Previous Audits__

MakerDAO has provided these completed audit review reports for reference. Any unfixed vulnerability mentioned in these reports are not eligible for a reward.

  - [https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/maker-protocol-liquidations-2-0/](https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/maker-protocol-liquidations-2-0/)  
  - [https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-g-uni-lp-oracle/](https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-g-uni-lp-oracle/) (narrowly scoped subsystem)
  - [https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-direct-deposit-module-d3m/](https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-direct-deposit-module-d3m/) 
  - h[ttps://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-optimism-dai-bridge/](https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-optimism-dai-bridge/) 
  - [StarkNet DAI Bridge audit](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1StG_v4qmV6EJjJDD-p7O11Ql3Dmrtfew/view?usp=share_link)
  - [StarkNet Teleport audit](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1113PnxOz2IjsQih0tMkVW_raWcum0ZgU/view?usp=share_link) 
  - [Direct Deposit V2 audit](https://github.com/makerdao/dss-direct-deposit/blob/master/audits/ChainSecurity_MakerDAO_Direct_Deposit_V2_audit.pdf)
  - [https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-dss-charter-smart-contracts/](https://chainsecurity.com/security-audit/makerdao-dss-charter-smart-contracts/)
  - [Lite PSM Audits](https://github.com/makerdao/dss-lite-psm/tree/main/audits) 

__Feasibility Limitations__

Bug reports that require an attack that involve one or more other protocols (e.g. utilizing flash loans from a margin protocol or manipulating the spot prices on a DEX), either to make an attack more severe than it would be in isolation, or to achieve an attack that would otherwise be impossible or infeasible, would be out-of-scope. However, they will be considered as in-scope and categorized according to the program rules as long as all of the following are true:

  - Losses or other negative effects of the attack are inflicted upon Maker ecosystem participants—MKR holders, DAI holders, Vault holders, or Keepers.
  - The losses or other negative effects could be prevented via changes to the MCD smart contracts already included in the bounty scope.
  - The additional protocols used must have enough liquidity in various assets to allow the attack to succeed at the time of bug report submission. For example: if an attack requires an ETH flash loan, but the amount is larger than all the ETH available for loan across the ecosystem

__Proof of Concept (PoC) Requirements__

A PoC is required for all bug reports

All PoCs submitted must comply with the [Immunefi-wide PoC Guidelines and Rules](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/9946217628561-Proof-of-Concept-PoC-Guidelines-and-Rules). Bug report submissions without a PoC when a PoC is required will not be provided with a reward.

__Other Terms and Information__

- Exceptions to the PoC requirement for smart contract bugs may be made in cases where the vulnerability is objectively evident from simply mentioning the vulnerability and where it exists. However, the bug reporter may be required to provide a PoC at any point in time. 

- A manipulation of the votes or the voting result, as well as the modification of its display leading to a misrepresentation of the result or vote would also qualify for a reward of __USD 100 000__. 

- Vulnerabilities that are exploitable in old versions of smart contracts and have since been mitigated (either deliberately or accidentally) in current versions (as demonstrated by the listing at [https://chainlog.makerdao.com/](https://chainlog.makerdao.com/)) are not in-scope for the bug bounty program. In the event that a vulnerability exists on the GitHub file but not on the most recently deployed contract, this may be due to a “dark spell” to fix a vulnerability quietly. If your bug report is rejected as a known issue due to this, details will be provided to you.

- In order to be eligible for a reward, the vulnerability must exist in the deployed smart contract.

- [https://chainlog.makerdao.com/](https://chainlog.makerdao.com/) is designed to be easy to run locally. Hence, taking down the application/website is considered out-of-scope for this asset.

- All Medium and High level bug reports are not in-scope for the [https://vote.makerdao.com/](https://vote.makerdao.com/) asset. Only Critical severity reports are in-scope for this asset.

- Vote comments are stored in a database accessed by [https://vote.makerdao.com/](https://vote.makerdao.com/). The critical functionality of the site (e.g., voting) is in-scope, but non-critical voter comments are out-of-scope.

- If you discover a vulnerability with Critical impact on any deployed smart contract, you may submit it for consideration.

- The dai.js repo ([https://github.com/makerdao/dai.js/](https://github.com/makerdao/dai.js/)) is NOT in scope even though it's a dependency of the Governance Portal ([https://vote.makerdao.com/](https://vote.makerdao.com/)).

- With regards to the terms under “Feasibility Limitations”, consideration may be made if the first two bullet points are met but the third isn’t, pending confirmation from the asset steward.

__Reward Payment Terms__

Payouts are handled by __MakerDAO__ governance. Payments are denominated in USD. However, payouts are done in DAI assuming a full 1:1 ratio with the USD. However, if the price of __DAI__ deviates from the USD value by more than 1%, the amount of __DAI__ will be adjusted. Upon confirmation, bug bounty payouts should be included in the next possible 'executive spell', which is a governance vote with an onchain payload attached to it. This would involve sending DAI directly from the protocol's buffer to the security researcher. As described in the Maker Atlas, for bug bounty rewards over __USD 1 000 000__, after the first million is paid out, the remaining amount is paid out over time with up to __USD 1 000 000__ per consecutive month until the determined amount for payout is reached.

Due to the limitations of the MakerDAO governance process, payouts will have a delay of up to 1 calendar month after the date of validation of the bug report.

MakerDAO

Resources & Documentation