Active pool https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xf294ea272d6f8fedc08acf8e93ff50fe99e1f7e8?__ctab=Code

Borrower ops https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x5b9db4b8bdef3e57323187a9ac2639c5dee5fd39?__ctab=Code

Coll surplus pool https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x310ec7fe6e4943da773de8948255e37cc45e34bb?__ctab=Code

Default pool https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xcdba14ca707b99afb8ca93e178ad614db422a030?__ctab=Code

Fees distributor  https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x1261d5872d56e2ab61b3c68451d015b752105027?__ctab=general

Hint helpers https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x1d7dac5a63a35540be9e031212ecf39584ae5595?__ctab=Code

Liquity base params https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xf8b04a36c36d5dbd1a9fe7b74897c609d6a17aa2?__ctab=Code

Multi trove getter https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xf265a169191348c02829b62650b025bdeaf00ae4?__ctab=Code

Price feed https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x6d1d9574d67e04cf35fa1d916f763eddae03b75d?__ctab=Code

Rsk oracle https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x46cfec2cd43fc514eb1bec2868027dedf15f1d08?__ctab=Code

Sorted troves https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xdeeb95480b94f9395514fe35caf692a1c788dfe9?__ctab=Code

Stability pool https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xd46c0225d1331b46700d64ff8c906709d15c9202?__ctab=Code

Trove manager https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0x82b09695ee4f214f3a0803683c4aaec332e4e0a3?__ctab=Code

Trove manager redeem ops https://explorer.rsk.co/address/0xd3a497ec2de882daa13a04edfc792b3f42db47c0?__ctab=Code

Upgradable proxy (ALL ZERO CONTRACTS HAS THIS PROXY LOGICS)

Mynt admin proxy https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0x466e023ddd08b53385b4763b883ab63820c123df/source

DLLR https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0xc1411567d2670e24d9c4daaa7cda95686e1250aa/source

Masset manager https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0x5f777270259e32f79589fe82269db6209f7b7582/source

Fees vault https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0xb424b283276bf63c35d98346632af1802e196d9b/source

Fees manager https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0x36c6f1b5e9de57a59b41778a36f3dd9ed1851832/source

Basket manager https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0x68510c9a93e8fff4b5d9e307bd415e1dc3b7759a/source

MOC integration https://dashboard.tenderly.co/contract/rsk/0x9363323d9c653a2b89c758f62f5043f0b2c67c71/source

Impacts only apply to assets in active use by the project like contracts on mainnet or web/app assets used in production. Any impact that applies to assets not in active use, like test or mock files, are out-of-scope of the bug bounty program unless explicitly mentioned as in-scope. 

__Smart Contracts__ 

- __Smart Contracts - PoC__, Smart Contract bug reports are to include a runnable Proof of Concept (PoC) in order to prove impact.  
- For more information on PoCs please visit: [Proof of Concept (PoC) Guidelines and Rules](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/9946217628561-Proof-of-Concept-PoC-Guidelines-and-Rules)

__Web/App__ 

- __Web/App__ - Bug reports are to include a runnable Proof of Concept (PoC) in order to prove impact. 
- All web/app bug reports must come with a PoC with an end-effect impacting an asset-in-scope in order to be considered for a reward. All PoC content must adhere to the [PoC guidelines and rules of Immunefi](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/9946217628561-Proof-of-Concept-PoC-Guidelines-and-Rules). In the event that a PoC requires an attack on a web/app asset provided, they must still adhere to the rules provided, otherwise eligibility for a reward may be revoked. 
- For more information on PoCs please visit: [Proof of Concept (PoC) Guidelines and Rules](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/9946217628561-Proof-of-Concept-PoC-Guidelines-and-Rules)

Whitehats are highly encouraged to review any potential subdomains and what specific port(s) are in scope. Even though the domain may be the same, different ports may point to different assets.  

__Dev Environment and Documentation__

Zero and Mynt has included dev documentation and/or instructions to help in reviewing code and exploring for bugs:
- [https://github.com/DistributedCollective/zero](https://github.com/DistributedCollective/zero) (extensive README)

__Impacts to other assets__

Hackers are encouraged to submit issues outside of the outlined Impacts and Assets in Scope. 

If whitehats can demonstrate a critical impact on code in production for an asset not in scope, Zero and Mynt encourages you to submit your bug report using the “primacy of impact exception” asset. 

__Impacts in Scope__

(For Blockchain/DLT and Smart Contracts Only) This program is considered to be governed by Primacy of Impact. For more information on what this means visit: [Best Practice - Primacy of Impact vs Primacy of Rules. ](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/12340245635089-Best-Practices-Primacy-of-Impact)

Impacts are based on the [Immunefi Vulnerability Severity Classification System V2.2.](https://immunefi.com/immunefi-vulnerability-severity-classification-system-v2-2/)

At Immunefi, we classify bugs on a simplified 5-level scale:
- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Low
- None


Mynt and Zero bug bounty program includes in its scope actively used contracts as part of Sovryn’s Mynt and Zero smart contract systems and the accompanying frontend web application. Mynt is a BTC-backed stablecoin aggregator. Zero is a decentralized borrowing protocol.

Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield

Permanent freezing of funds

Protocol insolvency

Execute arbitrary system commands resulting in financial loss

Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server resulting in financial loss, such as: /etc/shadow, database passwords, blockchain keys (this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)

Taking state-modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as: Voting, Making trades, Withdrawals, etc.

Subdomain takeover with already-connected wallet interaction resulting in financial loss

Direct theft of user funds

Malicious interactions with an already-connected wallet such as: Modifying transaction arguments or parameters, Substituting contract addresses, Submitting malicious transactions

Theft of unclaimed yield

Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Temporary freezing of funds: >2 blocks

Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without Javascript (Persistent) such as: HTML injection without Javascript, Replacing existing text with arbitrary text, Arbitrary file uploads, etc.

Taking down the application/website

Block stuffing for profit

Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)

Theft of gas

Unbounded gas consumption in state changing functions

Changing non-sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as: Changing the name of user, Enabling/disabling notifications

Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without Javascript (Reflected) such as: Reflected HTML injection, Loading external site data

Redirecting users to malicious websites (Open Redirect)

Subdomain takeover without already-connected wallet interaction

Improperly disclosing confidential user information such as: Email address, Phone number, Physical address, etc.

Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value

Please review how rewards are distributed based on the [Immunefi Vulnerability Severity Classification System V2.2.](https://immunefi.com/immunefi-vulnerability-severity-classification-system-v2-2/) This is a simplified 5-level scale system with separate scales for Smart Contracts and Websites/Apps.

Rewards for critical smart contract bug reports will be further capped at __10%__ of direct funds at risk if the bug discovered is exploited. However, there is a minimum reward of __USD 50 000__.

In cases of repeatable attacks, only the first attack is considered unless the smart contract cannot be upgraded or paused. If the attack impacts a smart contract directly holding funds that cannot be upgraded or paused, the amount of funds at risk will be calculated with the first attack being at 100% of the funds that could be stolen and then a reduction of 25% from the amount of the first attack for every __300 blocks__ the attack needs for subsequent attacks from the first attack, rounded down. For avoidance of doubt, if a second attack would happen at __600 blocks__ and then a third at __900 blocks__, the funds at risk would be counted at 50% and 25% from the first attack, respectively.

__Payouts and Payout Requirements:__

Payouts are handled by the Sovyrn team directly and are denominated in USD. However, payouts are done in RBTC and SOV. The payment is made up of 50% in RBTC and 50% in SOV in a 24 month vesting contract. 

Sovyrn commits to honoring payouts according to the terms set out in this program at the time of report submission, and to treat this program as the agreement and source of truth concerning bug reports and responsible disclosures. 

For the purposes of determining report validity, this is a __Primacy of Impact__ program. 

Learn more about report validity best practices here: [Best Practice - Primacy of Impact vs Primacy of Rules. ](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/12340245635089-Best-Practices-Primacy-of-Impact)

__KYC Requirements__

Zero and Mynt __does not__ have a Know Your Customer (KYC) requirement for bug bounty payouts.

__Audit Discoveries and Known Issues__

Bug reports covering previously-discovered bugs are not eligible for any reward through the bug bounty program. If a bug report covers a known issue, it may be rejected together with proof of the issue being known before escalation of the bug report via Immunefi. 

Previous audits and known issues can be found at:
- [https://github.com/DistributedCollective/sovryn-audits/blob/main/Smart%20Contract%20Audit_%20Zero.pdf ](https://github.com/DistributedCollective/sovryn-audits/blob/main/Smart%20Contract%20Audit_%20Zero.pdf)
- [https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/LiquityProtocolandStabilityPoolFinalReport.pdf ](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/LiquityProtocolandStabilityPoolFinalReport.pdf)
- [https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/LiquityProxyContracts.pdf ](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/LiquityProxyContracts.pdf)
- [https://www.coinspect.com/liquity-audit/ ](https://www.coinspect.com/liquity-audit/)
- [https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/Liquity.pdf ](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/Liquity.pdf)
- [https://omniscia.io/sovryn-babelfish-protocol-v1/ ](https://omniscia.io/sovryn-babelfish-protocol-v1/)
- __Issue with MocIntegration.sol when Fees are Introduced__
The function getDocFromDllrAndRedeemRBTC in MocIntegration.sol will always revert when fees are introduced for calling redeem (which is currently not the case) due to a require statement on line 86.

require(
            massetManager.redeemTo(address(doc), _dllrAmount, thisAddress) == _dllrAmount,
            "MocIntegration:: redeemed incorrect DoC amount"
        );

Once fees are introduced redeemTo would always return less than _dllrAmount.

- __Missing Bridge Check in tokensReceived__
The function tokensReceived in MassetManager.sol lacks a check to ensure that it is called from the bridge. If an external entity relies on this event, it could result in an error, unexpected behaviour, or token loss.

- __Two-Way Pointers Between Contracts Could Break__
Some contracts have two-way pointers that may break due to errors made by programmers or deployers. Ideally, modifying one contract should also modify the other. Examples of such contracts include MassetManager <-> DLLR, and MassetManager <-> BasketManagerV3.

- __mint Can be Called on MetaAssetToken__
While transfer, transferFrom, and transferWithPermit have recipient checks in place, mint does not. As a result, it can be called with the MetaAssetToken contract as a recipient.

- __Changing factor and bridge of a Basset Can Break Usage__ 
There is currently no check to ensure that there are no massets issued for a basset before changing its factor or bridge, which could potentially result in a bad ratio between masset and basset. I suggest a require statement be added to these functions.

- __Malicious Bridge Can Cause Griefing__ 
A malicious or compromised bridge for a specific basset could force a user to convert their massets into that basset using redeemByBridge in MassetManager, even if the user has no interest in the basset or does not trust the bridge or token. I recommend that a signature check be added to this function.

- __Lack of Owner Check in upgradeToV3__ 
The call to upgradeToV3 is in a separate transaction from deployment or initialization, and could potentially be front-run. There is currently no owner check in place for this function.


Mynt and Zero

Resources & Documentation